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Abstract
We introduce a measure for the level of stability against
coalitional deviations, called stability scores, which
generalizes widely used notions of stability in non-
cooperative games. We use the proposed measure to com-
pare various Nash equilibria in congestion games, and to
quantify the effect of game parameters on coalitional sta-
bility. For our main results, we apply stability scores to
analyze and compare the Generalized Second Price (GSP)
and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) ad auctions. We show
that while a central result of the ad auctions literature is
that the GSP and VCG auctions implement the same out-
come in one of the equilibria of GSP, the GSP outcome
is far more stable. Finally, a modified version of VCG
is introduced, which is group strategy-proof, and thereby
achieves the highest possible stability score.
1 Introduction
One of the most basic questions of game theory is: given
a game in strategic form, what is its solution? By solution
we typically mean a strategy profile that can be proposed
to all agents, and no rational agent would want to deviate
from it. Thus a solution should be stable. Many solution
concepts for games have been studied; these studies differ
by the level and interpretation of stability, as well as by
the underlying assumptions that are required to achieve it.
The best known solution concept for games is the Nash
equilibrium (NE), a strategy profile from which no agent
has an incentive to deviate unilaterally.
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A basic problem with the NE solution concept is that
a NE does not take into account joint deviations by coali-
tions of players. We usually assume that an individual will
deviate from a profile if she has an available strategy that
strictly increases her payoff. In some settings it would be
natural to assume also that a group of individuals will de-
viate if they have an available joint strategy that strictly
increases the payoff of each group member. The Strong
Equilibrium (SE) concept by Aumann [2] deals with this
problem. A profile is a SE if no coalition of agents can
jointly deviate in a way that strictly increases the payoff of
each coalition member. Intermediate levels of coalitional
stability have been suggested, such as stability against de-
viations of small coalitions (see e.g. [1]), and in particu-
lar pairs. An even more appealing solution concept than
SE is the Super-Strong Equilibrium (SSE) that considers
deviations in which no member loses while at least one
member makes a positive gain (see, for example, [10]).
A major problem with these proposed solutions is that
they seldom exist. Indeed, SSE rarely exist even in cases
where strong equilibria do exist (e.g., in simple conges-
tion games [12, 1]), and even if only deviations by pairs
are considered.
In this paper we relax the strong requirement that no
coalition will have an incentive to deviate, and suggest
a quantitative measure to coalitional stability. Assuming
we have a Nash equilibrium profile of a game where some
pairs of agents can still deviate, we may still wish to mea-
sure its stability by referring to the number of pairs that
have beneficial deviations from that profile. More gener-
ally, given a game and a strategy profile, we can associate
with it a tuple in which the r-th entry in the tuple is the
number of coalitions of size r that can gain by a deviation.
This tuple determines the stability score of the strategy
profile.
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Given two strategy profiles, we need a way to decide
which one is more stable. A common practice in game
theory is to prefer strategy profiles that are in equilibrium,
i.e. in which there are no unilateral deviations. Since
small coalitions are more likely to form and maintain
cooperation, a natural extension is to compare stability
scores of games with associated strategy profiles using a
lexicographic ordering of the corresponding vectors.1 For
example, given two n-person games, G1 and G2, with re-
spective Nash equilibria s1 and s2, the stability score of
the former will be higher if the number of beneficial devi-
ations by pairs from s1 in G1 is smaller than the number
of beneficial deviations by pairs from s2 in G2.
While the existence of, say, 19 coalitions that can devi-
ate rather than 15 does not have much significance, we
usually care about the behavior in some parameterized
family of games where parameters may include number
of players, size of the strategy space, etc. If the score of a
is asymptotically lower than the score of a′ (w.r.t. one of
the parameters), then this may indicate that a′ is substan-
tially more prone to coalitional deviations.
Moreover, when studying such a parametrized family,
stability scores may assist us in understanding how the
parameters of the game affect coalitional stability. This
holds even if there is a unique or a prominent equilibrium.
Stability scores are particularly useful in the context of
mechanism design, as they allow us to quantify the coali-
tional stability of various mechanisms and to compare
mechanisms that operate in a specific domain. To illus-
trate this point, we consider two central mechanisms in
what is perhaps the most widely studied economic setup
in recent years: ad auctions. We analyze in detail the
Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction and the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, and compare their stability
scores.
1.1 Related work
Related solution concepts in games
In the context of non-cooperative games approximate sta-
bility is typically measured by the strength of the incentive
1There are many ways to compare stability score vectors. Choosing
the “right” one highly depends on the context and underlying assump-
tions. However in this paper we avoid such complications by only com-
paring deviations of coalitions of the same size.
required to convince an agent to deviate, captured for ex-
ample by the concept of ǫ-Nash equilibrium. As discussed
above, stability against collusion is captured by concepts
such as SE and SSE, but these often do not allow a fine
distinction between various outcomes.
In addition, coalitions are the key component in coop-
erative game theory, and many variations of coalitional
stability have been studied. While we are unaware of solu-
tions concepts that quantify stability by measuring coali-
tional deviations, models of restricted cooperation capture
social constraints that may prevent the formation of some
coalitions [17]. Thus a (cooperative) game may not be sta-
ble against every coalitional deviation (i.e. have an empty
core), but still satisfy all the coalitions that can form in
practice. Recently, some papers studied how such social
context affects the stability of the game [7, 16]. More-
over, even if some coalition can gain by deviation, it may
or may not do so: Members of the coalition might inten-
tionally avoid cooperation based on far-sighted prediction
(an assumption underlying coalition-proofness for exam-
ple [4]), or just fail to recognize the benefit in deviating.
This is especially true if the coalition is large. Stability
scores do not assume a particular social context or incen-
tive structure, but simply try and minimize the number of
coalitions with profitable deviations.
Collusion and equilibria in ad auctions
Major results of previous work on ad auctions, charac-
terized a special family of equilibria of GSP the auction
(used in practice), termed Symmetric Nash Equilibria, or
SNE (see Section 4.1 for details) [19]. SNEs have many
attractive properties which make them a natural choice
as outcomes of the GSP auction. Moreover, it has been
shown that the SNE leading to the lowest revenue for the
seller (termed Lower Equilibrium (LE)), coincides with
the natural equilibrium of VCG where all bidders report
their true values.
The above results led to a surge of papers comparing
VCG and the various equilibrium outcomes of GSP, un-
der both public information and private information set-
tings [13, 18, 9, 14]. However, these comparisons fo-
cused mainly on revenue, rather than on coalitional sta-
bility. The VCG mechanism was shown to be vulnerable
to collusion in various domains (see, e.g., [6, 3] for rela-
tively recent work), compared to a simple first-price (pay-
2
your-bid) auction. The formal literature on collusion in
second-price auctions goes back to Graham and Marshall
[11], while the literature on the more involved matter of
collusion in first-price auctions goes back to McAfree and
McMillan [15].
1.2 Our contribution
Stability scores are formally defined in Section 2, where
we show how they generalize well known solution con-
cepts. In Section 3 we study strict stability scores in a
simple family of congestion games. The main purpose of
this study is to demonstrate how stability scores can be
used in order to compare different Nash equilibria, and to
measure how stability is affected by game’s parameters.
Moreover, while the studied family itself is quite simple,
it is often used to model real world situations such as load
balancing. Our analysis can give some intuition as to the
main factors affecting coalitional stability in such games.
The main results are in Section 4, where we present the
VCG and GSP mechanisms for ad auctions (adopting the
original model advocated for that setting in the seminal
work by Varian [19] and by Edelman et al. [8]), and show
bounds on stability scores in these auctions. In particu-
lar, we study how the stability of GSP varies as a function
of the distributions of agents’ valuations and slots’ click-
through rates, thereby showing that under certain reason-
able conditions GSP is far more stable than VCG.
In Section 5 we introduce a modification to the VCG
auction that can be used to overcome the observed insta-
bility of VCG. In particular, we show that a revised VCG,
in which a random reserve price is introduced, induces
truth-telling as a super-strong equilibrium.
Most proofs are deferred to the appendix to allow con-
tinuous reading.
2 Preliminaries
Games and equilibria
LetG = 〈N, {Ai}i∈N , {ui}i∈N 〉 be a normal form game,
where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, Ai is the set
of actions available to player i, and ui : A → R is player
i’s utility, where A = A1 × · · · × An is the set of joint
actions (profiles), and for every a ∈ A, ui(a) denotes
the utility of player i under action profile a. The vector
of actions of all players except player i in the profile a
is denoted by a−i. An action profile a ∈ A is a Nash
Equilibrium (NE) if ui(a) ≥ ui(bi, a−i) for every agent
i ∈ N and every alternative action bi ∈ Ai.
When considering coalitions, given an action profile a,
we denote by aS the profile of agents in S, and by AS the
set of all such joint actions. The profile of all agents in
N \ S is denoted by a−S .
Given a profile of actions a ∈ A, bS ∈ AS is a strict
deviation from a if ui(bS , a−S) > ui(aS , a−S) for every
i ∈ S. The profile a is termed a Strong Equilibrium (SE)
if there are no S ⊆ N and bS ∈ AS , such that bS is a strict
deviation from a.
One can also consider the following weaker notion of
deviation. Given a profile of actions a ∈ A, bS ∈ AS is a
deviation from a if ui(bS , a−S) ≥ ui(aS , a−S) for every
i ∈ S and there exists j ∈ S such that uj(bS , a−S) >
uj(aS , a−S) . The profile a is termed a Super-Strong
Equilibrium (SSE) if there is no S ⊆ N, bS ∈ AS that is
a deviation from a. Since every strict deviation is clearly
a deviation, every SSE is also a SE.
SSE captures the natural requirement that we should
resist even situations in which a deviation only benefits
some of the deviators without hurting others. A strategy
profile is r-SE (respectively, r-SSE) if there are no coali-
tions of size at most r that have strict deviations (resp.,
deviations).
Stability scores
The stability score of the profile a in game G is defined
as a vector with n entries. For every 1 ≤ r ≤ n, let
Dr(G, a) ∈ N (respectively, SDr(G, a) ∈ N) be the
number of coalitions of size r that have deviations (resp.,
strict deviations) from a in G. While there are many ways
to impose an order on equilibria based on these vectors,
we believe that the following lexicographic order is par-
ticularly natural.
Given two n-player games G and G′ and two pro-
files a and a′ in the respective games, we say that the
pair (G, a) is more resistant to deviations (or more sta-
ble) than (G′, a′), if there exists some r ≤ n such that
Dr(G, a) < Dr(G′, a′) and the terms are equal for every
r′ < r. We can similarly compare strict stability scores to
one another.
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Our definition of stability score generalizes some
widely used notions of stability. For example, a is a Nash
equilibrium (NE) of G iff D1(G, a) = SD1(G, a) = 0.
This means that the score of a NE (by either definition)
is always strictly better than the score of any profile that
is not a NE. Further, any profile that is r-SE has a better
strict-stability score than any non r-SE profile. A simi-
lar property holds w.r.t. r-SSE. As a different example, a
profile a is Pareto efficient in G iff Dn(G, a) = 0.
3 Resource Selection Games
In this section we demonstrate how stability scores can
be used to measure and compare the stability of different
outcomes in a given game. To this end we focus on a very
simple parametrized family, where games are known to
posses at least one pure equilibrium. A natural choice is
the family of resource selection games (RSG) with iden-
tical resources.
In a RSG there is a set of resources F = {1, . . . ,m},
and a non-decreasing cost function c : [n] → R+, where
[n] = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent i ∈ N can select ex-
actly one resource j, and suffers a cost (negative utility)
of c(nj), where nj is the number of agents that selected
resource j. RSGs are potential games and thus always ad-
mit a pure Nash equilibrium. In fact, any NE a of a RSG
G = 〈F,N, c〉 is a strong equilibrium [12], and thus all
equilibria have the same (strict) stability score. However,
this is no longer true if the games are concatenated in a
sequence.
Formally, a sequential RSG (SRSG) is a RSG with k
steps. Thus a strategy of an agent ai ∈ F k requires se-
lecting one resource in each step (actions may not depend
on the previous steps).2 We next show that the number of
coalitional deviations significantly depends on the played
equilibrium. We consider games where m,n, k ≥ 2, fo-
cusing mainly on games with 2 steps.
3.1 Counting deviations: an example
Suppose that m = 4, n = 6, k = 2 and that c(t) = t
for all t ≤ n. Any profile in which there are exactly 1 or
2Equivalently, the game can be described as a routing game, with k
sequential parts and m parallel edges in each part.
2 agents on each resource (in each step) is a Nash equi-
librium. However, these equilibria differ in their stability
against strict deviation of pairs. Suppose that in the first
step agents are partitioned {1, 2}, {3, 4},{5}, {6}, and re-
peat the same actions in the second step. Denote this pro-
file by a. In this case the pair {1, 2} can strictly gain as
follows: agent 1 joins agent 5 (or 6) in the first step, and
agent 2 joins 5 in the second. Thus the cost for each of the
two agents drops from 4 to 3. The pair {3, 4} can do the
same, thus SD2(G, a) = 2.
On the other hand, consider a profile b where players
play in the first step as in a, and in the second step are par-
titioned {1, 3}, {2, 4}, {5}, {6}; then no pair can strictly
gain by deviating. Notice though, that this is still not a
strong equilibrium, as the coalition {1, 2, 3, 4} can still
gain (agents 2, 3 deviate in the first step, and 1, 4 in the
second), thus SD2(G,b) = 0 and SD4(G,b) = 1.
Finally, in profile c agents are partitioned
{1, 5}, {2, 6}, {3}, {4} (in the second step), and this
is a strong equilibrium, i.e. SDr(G, c) = 0 for all r. It
therefore follows that w.r.t strict stability scores c is more
stable than b, which is more stable than a.
Note however that none of these profiles is an SSE or
even 2-SSE. More generally, in any profile in G there is at
least one pair (in fact two) that shares a resource and thus
they have a (weak) deviation where just one of them gains.
Thus for every profilep inG, we have thatD2(G,p) ≥ 2.
3.2 Bounding stability scores in two-step
RSG
The example above shows that different NE profiles in a
particular game may differ in their stability to deviations
of pairs or larger coalitions. We want to get a better pic-
ture of the gap between the most and least stable NE pro-
files, focusing on pair deviations. For the results in this
section, we will restrict our cost function to be convex.
A nondecreasing cost function c : [n] → R is said to
be convex if it has an increasing marginal loss; i.e., c(i +
1) − c(i) ≤ c(j + 1) − c(j) for every i < j. Note that
when facing a convex cost function, agents in an RSG try
to minimize the maximal number of agents using a single
resource. If the number of agents on every resource is
the same, we say that the partition is balanced. If these
numbers differ by at most one, we say that the partition is
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nearly balanced.
Let G be a two-step game with a convex cost function.
Note that when n mod m = 0, any NE is a balanced
partition of agents to resources (in each step). In such
partition, no coalition can gain by deviating, as at least one
deviating agent will end up paying more in expectation.
If, in addition, costs are strictly convex, then even weak
deviations are impossible. Since in this setting every NE
is an SE (and even an SSE), stability scores are trivial. We
therefore assume that n mod m = q > 0.
Let aˆ be the profile with the highest number of pair de-
viations, and let a∗ be the profile with the lowest number
of pair deviations.
Proposition 1. SD2(G, aˆ) = Θ
(
qn2
m2
)
.
sketch of lower bound. We note that in aˆ agents play
some nearly balanced partition in the first step, and re-
peat the same partition in the second step. Thus some re-
sources (called full) will have ⌈n/m⌉ agents, and the oth-
ers will have ⌊n/m⌋ agents. A crucial observation used
in the proof (and in the proofs of the other propositions in
this section), is that a pair has a strict deviation if and only
if it shares a full resource in both steps. Then (similarly
to the example above) one agent switches to a non-full re-
source in the first step, and the other does the same in the
second step.
Note that when q = Θ(m), which is a typical situation,
there are over Ω
(
n2
m
)
deviating pairs.
We find that the best NE a∗ is significantly better than
aˆ.
Proposition 2. SD2(G, a∗) = O
(
n2
m2
)
. Further, if ei-
ther n < m2 or q ≤ m2 , then SD2(G, a∗) = 0, i.e. a∗ is
2-SE.
In order to achieve the upper bound asserted in the
proposition we define a profile that tries to scatter in the
second step agents that shared a resource in the first step.
As a qualitative conclusion, we see that in order to min-
imize possible deviations, agents should form a partition
in the second step that differs as much as possible from
the partition in the first step.
3.3 SRSGs with many steps
The following proposition quantifies the stability score of
a random pure NE in a RSG with k steps. Note that the
set of pure NEs coincides with the set of profiles that are
nearly balanced in each step.
Proposition 3. Let G be an SRSG with k steps and a con-
vex cost function, and let a be a random NE in G. The
expected number of deviating pairs in G is SD2(G, a) ∼=(
n
2
)
(1− (1 + α)e−α), where α = q(k−1)m2 .
We can summarize how the parameters affect stability
as follows. If the number of steps k is small, and the
number of resources m increases, then α → 0, and thus
SD2(G, a) → 0 as well (i.e. there are very few pairs that
can deviate). Conversely, when the number of steps grows
(in particular when k ≫ m2q ), then almost every pair can
deviate with a high probability.
As a corollary of Proposition 3 when k = 2, we get the
lower bound of Proposition 1 for the case q = Θ(m), as
SD2(G, aˆ) ≥
(
n
2
)(
1−
(
1− 1
m
)(
1 +
1
m
))
= Ω
(
n2
m
)
.
4 Stability Scores in Ad Auctions
Having showed how stability scores can be used to ana-
lyze coalitional stability in simple games, we next turn to
prove our main results. We compute the stability scores
of the VCG and GSP ad auctions, which are central to the
recent literature on economic mechanism design. Since
both auctions admit strong equilibria, we do not consider
strict deviations, and instead focus our analysis on weak
deviations and the scores they induce.
4.1 Ad auctions: model and notations
An ad auction has s slots to allocate, and n ≥ 2s bidders,3
each with valuation vi per click [19]. Every slot 1 ≤ j ≤
s is associated with a click-through rate (CTR) xj > 0,
where xj ≥ xj+1. For mathematical convenience, we
define xj = 0 for every j > s. Throughout the paper we
3When discussing deviating pairs it is sufficient to assume n > s,
which is a typical situation. Also, all of our results can be easily adjusted
to cases with fewer bidders.
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make the simplifying assumptions that CTRs are strictly
decreasing (i.e., xj > xj+1), and that vi 6= vj for all
i 6= j. We denote by bold letter the corresponding vectors
of valuations, CTRs, and bids (e.g. b = (b1, . . . , bn)).
A bidder i that has been allocated slot j gains vi per
click (regardless of the slot), and is charged pj per click.
Thus, her total utility is given by ui = (vi − pj)xj .
VCG. In the VCG mechanism every bidder i submits
a bid bi, and the mechanism allocates the j’th slot, j =
1, . . . , s, to the j’th highest bidder. Each bidder j is
charged (per click) for the “harm” she poses to the other
bidders, i.e., the difference between the welfare of bidders
k 6= j if j is omitted and their welfare when j exists.
It is well known that the VCG mechanism is truth-
ful, meaning that reporting true valuations bj = vj is a
(weakly) dominant strategy for all bidders. In particular,
it is a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that bidders’ valuations are sorted in non-
increasing order. Assuming truthful bidding (i.e. bj = vj
for all j), each bidder i ≤ s is allocated slot i, and pays
pV CGi =
∑
s+1≥j≥i+1
xj−1 − xj
xi
· vj . (1)
GSP. In the GSP auction, slot j is given to the j’th highest
bidder (as in the VCG auction). Denote by j the bidder
who is getting slot j. The charge of bidder j = 1, . . . , s
equals to the bid of the next bidder; i.e., pj = bj+1. For
mathematical convenience, we define bj+1 = 0 for j ≥ n.
GSP equilibria. Varian [19] identifies a set of natural
Nash equilibria of the GSP auction, termed envy free NE
or Symmetric NE (SNE), which are characterized by a set
of recursive inequalities. Varian shows that all SNE’s sat-
isfy some very convenient properties. First, in SNE no
bidder wants to swap slots with any other bidder.4 Sec-
ond, SNEs are efficient in the sense that bidders with
higher valuations always bid higher (and thus get better
slots). This allows us to assume that valuations are also
sorted in non-decreasing order v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn.
Lastly, SNEs can be easily computed by a recursive for-
mula, which makes them especially attractive for comput-
erized and online settings.
4When swapping with a bidder in a worse slot, this requirement co-
incides with the one implied by NE. However when swapping with a
bidder in a better slot, envy-freeness is slightly stronger.
The two equilibria that reside on the boundaries of
the SNE set, referred to as Lower Equilibrium (LE) and
Upper Equilibrium (UE), are of particular interest. We
denote the LE and UE profiles by bL = (bLi )i∈N and
bU = (bUi )i∈N , respectively. The bids in the LE, for ev-
ery 2 ≤ i ≤ s+ 1, are given by
bLi xi−1 = vi(xi−1 − xi) + bLi+1xi =
∑
s+1≥j≥i
vj(xj−1 − xj).
In particular, since CTRs are strictly decreasing, we get
that bi > bi+1 for all i ≤ s. A central result by Varian [19]
is that the LE equilibrium induces payments, utilities, and
revenue equal to those of the truthful outcome in VCG.
It is therefore of great interest to compare the stability of
these seemingly identical outcomes in both mechanisms.
The bids in the UE, for every 2 ≤ i ≤ s+ 1, are given
by
bUi xi−1 = vi−1(xi−1−xi)+bUi+1xi =
∑
s+1≥j≥i
vj−1(xj−1−xj).
In the remaining of this section we measure the stabil-
ity of the VCG and GSP mechanisms. Our results indi-
cate that while the mechanisms have seemingly identical
outcomes, for many natural valuation and CTR functions,
GSP is far more stable than VCG.
4.2 Deviations in VCG
Recall that the payment for bidder i is a weighted aver-
age of reported (and by truthfulness, the actual) values of
bidders i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ s+ 1 (see Eq. (1)).
We next characterize the structure of a set of deviators
R of size r. We say that a coalition R of r bidders has
a potential to deviate under VCG (or that it is a potential
coalition), if either: (a) the group R contains exactly r
winners (i.e., bidders that are allocated a slot j ≤ s); or
(b) the set R is composed of t < r winners, the first loser,
and the r− t− 1 bidders that directly follow (i.e., bidders
s+ 1 through s+ r − t).
We denote the number of potential coalitions of size
r by Mr. We argue that it only makes sense to count
potential coalitions when considering a deviation.
To see why, note first that all bidders ranked s + r or
worse have no effect on the payment of any other bid-
der, and can be ignored. Second, the bidders ranked
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s + 2, . . . , s + r − 1 are only effective if they allow
the bidder allocated slot s + 1 to lower her bid. Thus
non-potential coalitions must contain at least one bidder
that has no contribution at all to the deviation, and can
therefore be ignored. Note for example that while adding
dummy bidders (with valuation 0) increases the total num-
ber of coalitions, the number of potential coalitions re-
mains unchanged.
It is easy to verify that there are
(
s
r
)
coalitions of type
(a), and ∑r−1t=1 (st) coalitions of type (b). Thus Mr =∑r
t=1
(
s
t
)
. Interestingly, in VCG every potential coalition
can actually deviate.
Proposition 4. Under the truthful equilibrium of VCG,
denoted by T , any potential coalition has a deviation, i.e.,
Dr(V CG, T ) = Mr for all 2 ≤ r ≤ s.
Proof. Let R be some potential coalition, and i∗ ∈
argmini∈R vi. We call i∗ the indifferent bidder. Suppose
that every agent i ∈ R reports v′i so that vi > v′i > vi+1.
Clearly, this has no effect on slot allocation. In coalitions
that include only winners, all the agents except agent i∗
(which is indifferent) pay strictly less than their original
payments, as the payment monotonically depends on the
valuations of the other members of R. In potential coali-
tions other type, where R includes t winners and r − t
losers, all t winners strictly gain.
4.3 Deviations in GSP
Since LE is a Nash equilibrium, we have that
D1(GSP,LE) = SD1(GSP,LE) = 0. In fact, as in
the VCG mechanism, no coalition has a strict deviation
from the LE profile in GSP. This statement is not as triv-
ial in the GSP mechanism, but it follows from Lemma 9
toward the end of this section. The same analysis holds
for the UE in GSP. We next turn to evaluate the resistance
of GSP to (non-strict) deviations, focusing on the lower
equilibrium. As in the previous section, we only count
potential coalitions as all other coalitions necessarily con-
tain redundant participants.
Pair deviations: characterization
We begin by characterizing all deviations by pairs of
agents.
Lower equilibrium. It is easy to see that for every i ≤ s,
the pair of agents (i, i+ 1) (called neighbors) can always
(weakly) gain as a coalition, by having agent i+ 1 lower-
ing her bid to b′i+1, so that bi+1 > b′i+1 > bi+2.5 In this
case, agent i + 1 is not affected, but agent i gains the dif-
ference xi(bi+1 − b′i+1) > 0. It is also clear that bidders
ranked s+2 or worse can never be part of a deviating pair.
In terms of the stability score, this means that
s ≤ D2(GSP,LE) ≤M2 =
(
s+ 1
2
)
.
Consider the pair of agents (k, j), where k < j ≤ s+1.
We want to derive a sufficient and necessary condition un-
der which the pair (k, j) has a deviation. A simple obser-
vation is that given some Nash equilibrium, for an agent
i to strictly gain by being allocated a new slot i′ 6= i,
the bid bi′+1 must strictly decrease, since otherwise this
would also be a deviation for i as a single agent (in con-
tradiction to equilibrium). Therefore, either (1) k moves
to a worse slot k′ = j − 1, and b′j < bj ; or (2) j moves
to a better slot j′ = k, k is pushed down to k′ = k + 1,
and b′k < bk. However, if j gains in case (2), then this
means she is envy in bidder k. This is impossible, as we
assumed b is an SNE. Thus, the only deviation is where
k′ = j − 1; j′ = j. Further, this is a deviation only if
bj−1 > b′k > b
′
j ≥ bj+1. Note that: (i) b′k can get
any value in this range without affecting the utility of k
or j, (ii) the utility of j remains the same, and (iii) the
most profitable deviation for k is one in which b′j = bj+1
(breaking the tie in favor of j).
The discussion above establishes a necessary condition
for a pair deviation, and asserts that in every pair devia-
tion of k, j only agent k can strictly gain, where k < j.
We next complete the characterization by establishing a
sufficient condition for pair deviation.
For the following results, we denote a = xj−1−xj (for
our fixed j), and wi = xi−1−xixj for all i ≤ s+ 1.
Lemma 5. Suppose that the pair k, j deviates from LE,
by moving agent k to slot k′ = j − 1. Let u(k), u′(k) be
the utility of agent k before and after the deviation, then
u(k)−u′(k) ≥
j−1∑
t=k+1
(xt−1−xt)(vk−vt)−a·vj+a
s+1∑
i=j+1
wivi.
5The assumption that CTRs are strictly decreasing is required here,
as otherwise bidder i+ 1 may not be able to lower her bid.
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Moreover, in the optimal deviation for agent k the last
inequality holds with an equality.
Proof. Suppose agent j lowers her bid to b′j = bj+1 + ǫ
where ǫ ≥ 0 (so j keeps her slot). For any x,v the utility
of agent k changes as follows:
u(k)− u′(k) = (vk − bk+1)xk − (vk − (bj+1 + ǫ))xj−1
= (xk − xj−1)vk −
s+1∑
t=k+1
(xt−1 − xt)vt
+
s+1∑
i=j+1
xj−1(xi−1 − xi)
xj
vi + ǫxj−1
=
j−1∑
l=k+1
(xl−1 − xl)vk −
j∑
t=k+1
(xt−1 − xt)vt
+
(
xj−1
xj
− 1
) s+1∑
i=j+1
(xi−1 − xi)vi + ǫxj−1
=
j−1∑
t=k+1
(xt−1 − xt)(vk − vt)− (xj−1 − xj)vj
+
xj−1 − xj
xj
s+1∑
i=j+1
(xi−1 − xi)vi + ǫxj−1
=
j−1∑
t=k+1
(xt−1 − xt)(vk − vt)
− a · vj + a
s+1∑
i=j+1
wivi + ǫxj−1.
The inequality follows since ǫ ≥ 0. In the optimal devi-
ation ǫ = 0 in which case we get an equality. Note that∑s+1
i=j+1 wivi is a weighted average of valuations. In par-
ticular, it is always between vs+1 and vj+1.
As a direct corollary from Lemma 5, we get that in LE
the pair k, j (where k < j−1), has a deviation if and only
if
j−1∑
t=k+1
(xt−1− xt)(vk − vt) < a · vj − a
s+1∑
i=j+1
wivi. (2)
Upper equilibrium. It is easy to check that a similar
characterization to Eq. (2) applies to the UE. However,
the conditions differ with respect to bidders that are two
positions apart.
Proposition 6. Given a UE, the pair of agents i, i+2 has
a deviation for every i < s.
This result holds under all valuation and CTR func-
tions; hence D2(GSP,UE) ≥ 2s − 1. This means that
the UE may be slightly less stable than LE (whose stabil-
ity is expressed in Theorem 7). Yet, it is not too difficult to
show that the number of pair deviations from UE and LE
are asymptotically the same. Therefore, in the remainder
of this section we focus on stability scores of LE.
Pair deviations: quantification
It turns out that the asymptotic number of pair deviations
strongly depends on the shape of both the CTR function
and the valuation function. In particular, convexity (as
well as concavity and β-convexity) will play a major role
in our results. Let g1, . . . , gm be a monotonically nonin-
creasing vector.
Similarly to the way defined convex cost functions in
Section 3, we say that g is convex if it has a decreasing
marginal loss; i.e., gi− gi+1 ≥ gj − gj+1 for every i < j.
Similarly, if g has an increasing marginal loss then it is
concave.
Note that linear functions are both convex and concave.
A special case of convexity (resp., concavity) is when the
marginal loss decreases (resp., increases) exponentially
fast.
Let β > 1. We say that g is β-convex if gi−1 − gi ≥
β(gi − gi+1) for every i. Similarly, g is said to be β-
concave if β(gi−1 − gi) ≤ gi − gi+1 for every i. 6
Intuitively, as either valuations or CTRs are “more”
convex,7 a bidder who deviates by moving to a lower
(i.e., worse) slot faces a more significant drop in her util-
ity. Thus we can hope that pairs that are sufficiently dis-
tant from one another will not be able to deviate jointly.
This intuition is further formalized and quantified in the
remainder of this section. For convenience, the results are
summarized in Table 1.
6Lucier et al. [14] studied GSP auctions with well-separated CTR
functions, which is a closely related term. In particular, a 1
β
-well sepa-
rated function is also β-convex.
7When referring to convexity of CTR/valuation functions, we only
consider the first s+ 1 values.
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❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
Valuations
CTR ← concave→ ← convex→
β-concave Linear β-convex
concave 2-concave All
(
s+1
2
)
All
(
s+1
2
)
-
Linear Ω(s2) Θ(s
√
s) O(s·logβ s)
convex 2-convex - s s
Table 1: The table summarizes the number of pairs that
have a deviation, i.e., D2(GSP,LE). When one func-
tion is strictly concave and the other is strictly convex, the
score may depend on the exact structure of both functions.
The next proposition demonstrates that convexity in-
duces greater stability.
Theorem 7. Suppose that both CTR and valuation func-
tions are convex. The number of pairs with deviations in
the Lower equilibrium can be upper bounded as follows.
(A) D2(GSP,LE) = O(s
√
s).
(B) if CTRs are β-convex then D2(GSP,LE) =
O(s logβ s).
(C) if valuations are β-convex, for any β ≥ 2, then only
neighbor pairs can deviate. I.e.,D2(GSP,LE) = s.
We present the proof of the first statement, so as to
demonstrate the proof technique.
of 7(a). Recall that a = xj−1 − xj > 0. A crucial obser-
vation is that
∑s+1
i=k+1 wivi is in fact a weighted average
of valuations, where the weight wi is proportional to the
difference xi−1 − xi. Therefore this average is biased to-
ward low values when CTR is convex, and toward high
values when it is concave.
Also, since CTRs are convex, we have that for all i < j,
xi−1 − xi ≥ a. Thus by Lemma 5,
u(k)−u′(k) ≥ a
j−1∑
t=k+1
(vk − vt)− a · vj + a
s+1∑
i=j+1
wivi
= a

 j−1∑
t=k+1
(vk − vt) +
s+1∑
i=j+1
wivi − vj


≥ a
(
j−1∑
t=k+1
(vk − vt) + avg
s+1≥i≥j+1
(vi)− vj
)
.
(3)
Therefore, in order to prove that the pair j, k can deviate,
it is necessary to showj−1∑
t=k+1
(vk − vt) < vj − avg
s+1≥i≥j+1
vi. (4)
We note that under linear CTRs, all inequalities become
equalities (in which case Equation (4) is also a sufficient
condition). Observe that closer pairs are more likely to
deviate. E.g. for pairs s.t. j = k + 2, it is sufficient that
vk− vk+1 < vk+2− avg
s≥t′≥k+3
vt′ to have a deviation. Let
h = j − 1− k ≥ 1, and z = vk − vj−1 = vk − vk+h.
From convexity of v it holds that for all h′ < h,
vk−vk+h′
h′ ≥ vk−vk+hh = zh , thus for the LHS of Eq. (4),
j−1∑
t=k+1
(vk−vt) ≥
j−1∑
t=k+1
z
t− k
h
=
z
h
h(h+ 1)
2
=
h+ 1
2
z.
(5)
Bounding the RHS of Eq. (4), we have
vj− avg
s+1≥i≥j+1
vi ≤ vj − vavg{s+1≥i≥j+1}
(convexity of v)
≤ vj − v⌈ j
2
+ s
2
⌉ = vj − v⌈j+ s−j
2
⌉
≤
⌈(s−j)/2h⌉∑
i′=1
(vj+(i′−1)h − vj+i′h) ≤
⌈(s−j)/2h⌉∑
i′=1
(vk − vk+h),
(6)
which is at most
⌈
s−j
2h
⌉
z. By using the bounds we showed
on both sides of the equation, condition (4) implies h +
1 <
⌈
s−j
h
⌉
, which must be false whenever h+1 = j−k >√
s. Therefore each winner k ≤ s can deviate with at
most
√
s other bidders, and there can be at most s
√
s such
pairs.
It is evident from Theorem 7, that convexity can guar-
antee some level of stability, and further, that “more” con-
vexity can induce more stability. Our next result comple-
ments this observation, by showing that concavity of val-
uation and CTR functions affects stability in the opposite
direction.
Theorem 8. Suppose that both CTR and valuation func-
tions are concave. The number of pairs with deviations in
the Lower equilibrium can be lower bounded as follows.
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(A) D2(GSP,LE) = Ω(s
√
s).
(B) if CTRs are β-concave for any β > 1, then
D2(GSP,LE) = Ω(s2) (i.e. a constant fraction of
all pairs).
(C) if valuations are β-concave, for any β ≥ 2, then all
pairs can deviate. I.e., D2(GSP,LE) =
(
s+1
2
)
=
M2.
A linear function is both convex and concave. There-
fore, in the special case where both CTRs and valuations
are linear, we obtain an asymptotically tight estimation of
D2(GSP,LE).
Deviations of more than two agents
We first characterize the structure of such deviations.
Lemma 9. Suppose that R ⊆ N is a coalition that gains
by a deviation, and let bj , b′j denote the bids of j ∈ R
before and after the deviation, respectively. Then the fol-
lowing hold:
(a) There is at least one bidder i∗ ∈ R that does not gain
anything from the deviation; this bidder is called the
indifferent bidder.
(b) There is at least one bidder f ∈ R s.t. R \ {f} still
has a deviation; this bidder is called a free rider.
(c) For all j ∈ R, either b′j < bj , or the utilities of all
agents in R (including j) are unaffected by the bid of
j.
In order to prove the Lemma, we must show that the
bidder that is ranked last among the deviators is an indif-
ferent bidder (i∗). The free rider (f ) is either the bidder
that is ranked first among the deviators, or some bidder
that is isolated of all other deviators. In addition, it is
shown that bidders that move to a better slot either strictly
lose, or cause some other deviator to strictly lose.
As a direct corollary of Lemma 9, given any coalition
R of size ≥ 3, the coalition R \ {f} can also deviate. By
induction, therefore, a coalition R that can deviate always
contains a pair that can deviate. Moreover, by part (c) of
Lemma 9, it follows that given a deviating coalition of
size ≥ 2, it can be extended by adding a bidder who does
not change her bid. As a result, a set R can deviate if
and only if it contains a pair that can deviate. This crucial
observation facilitates the computation of the number of
deviations by coalitions of size r for any r ≥ 3.
Recall that Mr denotes the number of potential coali-
tions of size r, and that under VCG auction all of
these coalitions actually have a deviation. Clearly,
Dr(GSP,LE) ≤ Mr. We next show how the accurate
number of coalitions asymptotically depends on the size
of the coalition r and on the number of slots s.
Proposition 10. If both CTRs and valuations are convex,
then
Dr(GSP,LE) ≤Mr ·O
(
r2√
s
)
.
In contrast, if both CTRs and valuations are concave, then
Dr(GSP,LE) ≥Mr · d ·
(
1− exp
(
−Ω
(
r
√
r√
s
)))
for any positive constant d < 1.
That is, at least in the convex case the number of po-
tential deviations under GSP is significantly smaller than
under VCG.
This result also establishes an almost sharp threshold
for the case of linear CTRs and valuations. In particular,
for every r ≫ 3√s, almost all coalitions of size r can
deviate, while the proportion of coalitions of size r ≪ 4√s
that can deviate goes to 0 (when r is fixed and as s grows).
Proposition 10 confirms that the GSP auction is far
more stable than the VCG auction against collusions of
relatively small coalitions (at least when CTR and valua-
tions are convex).
5 Eliminating Group Deviations
5.1 VCG with a reserve price
Consider a variant of the VCG mechanism that adds a
fixed reserve price c. That is, only bidders that reports a
value of c or higher get a slot, and payments are computed
ignoring the other bidders (i.e. replacing their values with
c). It is easy to verify that truth-telling remains a domi-
nant strategy, and that Proposition 4 remains valid if the
values of all bidders are strictly above c. However, a bid-
der whose value is exactly c will not join any coalition: by
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lowering her reported value she will lose her current slot
for sure, whereas previously she enjoyed a positive utility.
Now, consider a VCG mechanism that chooses a re-
serve price as follows. With probability q, the reserve
price is chosen randomly from a sufficiently large inter-
val, and with probability 1 − q, it is set to 0. Crucially,
the probability distribution of the reserve price is com-
mon knowledge, but agents submit their reports before its
realization is revealed. Let us denote the proposed mech-
anism by VCG∗. While the proposed adjustment seems
small, it results in a dramatic increase of stability.
Theorem 11. If s ≥ n, then truth-telling is a SSE in
VCG∗.
Proof. First observe that VCG∗ is a lottery over strate-
gyproof mechanisms, thus no single agent has an incen-
tive to deviate unilaterally. Suppose by way of contra-
diction that there exists a coalition that gains by a devia-
tion, and let R be such a coalition of minimal size. Since
R is minimal, the indifferent agent i∗ ∈ R (as defined
in Prop. 4) must lower her reported value, otherwise the
coalition R \ {i∗} can also deviate. Assume, therefore,
that v′i∗ = vi∗ − ǫ for some ǫ > 0. It is easy to verify
that there is no outcome of the mechanism under which i∗
gains. In contrast, there is a non-zero probability that c is
chosen in the range (v′i∗ , vi∗), in which case the utility of
i∗ becomes 0, compared to (vi∗ − c)xi∗ > 0 under truth-
telling. Therefore, agent i∗ loses in expectation, contra-
dicting the existence of a coalition R. The assertion of the
theorem is established.
By the last theorem, VCG∗ guarantees stability when-
ever n ≤ s.8 However, if s < n the bidder ranked s + 1
can serve as the indifferent bidder of any coalition. Con-
sequently, VCG∗ does not posses a SSE. That is, since the
utility of agent s+ 1 is always 0, she will not be discour-
aged by the random reserve price, even when her reported
value falls below the reserve price.
In order to deal with the lack of slots (i.e., the case in
which s ≤ n), we introduce a modified VCG∗ mecha-
nism, which always induces truth-telling as a SSE.
Consider the following modification to VCG∗, termed
VCG∗λ. Let 0 < λ < 1n . Given some slot j ≤ s with a
8The proof in fact shows a stronger result: truth-telling is a SSE in
dominant strategies. Thus VCG∗ is group-strategyproof.
CTR of xj > 0, it is allocated to the bidder that is ranked
j with probability 1 − λ, and is allocated to the bidder
that is ranked s+ 1 with probability λ. This modification
effectively creates a new slot s+ 1, whose expected CTR
is λxj , whereas the new (expected) CTR of slot j becomes
(1 − λ)xj . This procedure can be applied to the desired
additionaln−s slots. In particular, a possible instantiation
is where the new expected CTR of position s will be (1−
(n − s)λ)xs, and there will be n − s new slots with an
expected CTR of λxs. Since the new auction has n slots,
the mechanism VCG∗ can be performed to eliminate all
coalitional deviations.
The careful reader will notice that by changing the
CTRs, the equilibrium in the new auction may change.
However, as long as the order of the slots is preserved, the
equilibrium allocation is not affected, and this is ensured
by satisfying λ < 1n . Moreover, the new payment differs
from the original payment by at most v1 · n · λ; thus for
a sufficiently small λ the difference is negligible. As a
result, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 12. Truth-telling is a SSE in mechanism VCG∗λ
for every 0<λ< 1n . Moreover, the payments and revenue
of VCG∗λ can be arbitrarily close to the payments and rev-
enue of VCG.
5.2 GSP with a reserve price
As evident from the results in the last section, stability
of the VCG mechanism is significantly increased by aug-
menting the mechanism with a random reserve price and
additional subtle randomization. It might be tempting
to apply the same technique to the GSP mechanism, in
an attempt to increase its stability, while maintaining the
possibility to achieve a higher revenue than VCG. Unfor-
tunately, this approach fails since (in contrast to VCG)
adding a reserve price does not preserve its original set of
equilibria.
To see this, consider a GSP mechanism with a fixed re-
serve price c. Bidder i is affected by the reserve price if
either: (I) vi > c > bi, in which case bidder i has an
incentive to raise her bid, as otherwise she will lose the
slot; or (II) vi < c < bi, in which case she has an incen-
tive to lower her bid, as otherwise she will pay more than
the slot’s worth to her. In both cases it follows that the
modified GSP mechanism no longer preserves the SNE
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properties characterized by Varian (even with respect to
unilateral deviations). The reason for the difference be-
tween VCG and GSP is that VCG induces truthful reve-
lation in equilibrium; hence cases (I) and (II) suggested
above cannot be realized.
6 Discussion and future work
Our main contribution in this paper is the introduction of
stability scores — a new stability measure for game equi-
libria. We demonstrated how stability scores can be used
to compare equilibria in congestion games and to draw
qualitative results regarding properties of the game and
the profiles that increase coalitional stability.
Auctions. Our results indicate that for a prominent class
of CTR and valuation functions, GSP is far more stable
than VCG.9
It is known that the LE of GSP generates exactly the
same revenue as VCG, and any other SNE of GSP gener-
ates an even higher revenue. This may suggest that GSP
is better than VCG with respect to both revenue and sta-
bility. However, a relatively simple modification to the
VCG mechanism induces a randomized mechanism that
eliminates all coalitional deviations, thus turning it into a
highly stable mechanism. An open question is whether
our results still hold when ads’ quality is also considered
(see [19]).
Equilibria selection and mechanism design. Analysis
of stability scores can be applied to various games and
mechanisms. In particular, in games that have multiple
Nash equilibria such analysis can aid in selecting the an
equilibrium. Understanding how coalitional stability is
affected by properties of the game will help us to play
better as players, and to create better games as designers.
Toward a realistic picture of coalitional stability. So-
lution concepts such as ǫ-NE (or ǫ-SE) quantify the bene-
fit an agent or coalition can get from a deviation. There-
fore they offer stability under a relaxed notion of self-
interest (i.e. agents will only bother to deviate for some
substantial gain). In contrast, stability scores still assume
purely self-interested agents, but relax a different aspect
9Empirical studies indicate that CTRs on common platforms are in-
deed convex, see [5].
of coalitional rationality. Practical limitations on informa-
tion, communication or trust may mean that a coalition of
agents will not collude even if they have a potentially high
incentive to do so. Other models such as Myerson’s [17]
assume that limitations on collusion are given in an ex-
plicit and structured form.
In future research we may wish take a combined ap-
proach to coalitional stability, considering both known
and unknown limitations on collusion, possibly attribut-
ing more importance to coalitions with a stronger incen-
tive to deviate. Such models will enable us to better
predict realistic outcomes of games, and to improve the
mechanisms we design.
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A Appendix: Proofs of Section 3
PROPOSITION 1. D2(G, aˆ) = Θ
(
qn2
m2
)
.
Proof. The first observation is that any NE profile must be almost-balanced, in the sense that every resource has
⌊n/m⌋ agents (vacant) or ⌈n/m⌉ agents (full). Note that there are exactly q full resources in each iteration.
The second observation is that a pair has a strict deviation if and only if they share a full resource in both iterations.
Then one agent can switch to a vacant resource in the first iteration, and the other can do the same in the second
iteration. In each iteration one of them strictly gains and the other is unharmed.
It follows that in aˆ agents play the same partition in both iterations, and every pair that is in a full resource can
deviate. Since there are q full resources, there are q
(⌈n/m⌉
2
)
= Θ
(
qn2
m2
)
.
PROPOSITION 2.
(a) D2(G, a∗) = O
(
n2
m2
)
.
(b) if n < m2 then D2(G, a∗) = 0, i.e. a∗ is 2-SE.
(c) if q ≤ m/2, then D2(G, a∗) = 0.
Proof. If n < m2, then we show that a∗ is a 2-SE profile. Let A = (A1, A2, . . . , Am) be any almost-balanced
partition in the first iteration. That is, Ai contains the (⌈n/m⌉ or ⌊n/m⌋) agents that select resource i in the first
iteration. Assume each Ai is ordered as a vector (arbitrarily). Let A be vector of size n, created by concatenating
the vectors A1, . . . , Am. We construct the partition in the second iteration B, by adding each agent A(j) to resource
(j mod m). Since every |Ai| ≤ m, all agents in Ai end up in different resources in the second iteration. Thus
D2(G, a∗) = 0.
If n > m2 and q > m/2, then there is at least one resource with ≥ m + 1 agents. By pigeon hole, at least two
of these agents share a resource in the second iteration, thus D2(G, a∗) ≥ 1. However we can still upper bound the
stability score of a∗. Indeed, take any vector Ai, and divide it to subvectors Ai1, Ai2, . . ., each of size m. We now
create the partition B as described in the previous paragraph. As |Ai| may be more than m, it is possible that two
agents from Ai now share a resource in B. However if two agents belong to the same subvector Ai,t, they must be
in distinct resources in B, and thus cannot deviate. Also, every j ∈ Ai,t shares a resource in B with at most 1 other
agent from each other subvector Ai,t′ . Thus the number of pairs in Ai shat share a resource in B is at most
(⌈|Ai|/m⌉
2
)
(for example, B1 contains the first agent from each set A1,t, one agent from each A2,t, etc.). However, not all of these
pair can deviate. It is necessary that the resource shared in the first step is full (i.e. |Ai| = ⌈n/m⌉), and also the shared
resource in the second step. Thus, only a fraction of q/m of the pairs end up in a full resource in B. Thus for every
full resource i, we have at most ⌈|Ai|/m⌉ agents sharing a resource in B. Summing the pairs from Ai over the q full
resources of B, we have (at most)
q
(⌈|Ai|/m⌉
2
)
= Θ
(
q
( n
m2
)2)
deviating pairs, and the total number of deviating pairs in all q full resources of A is
D2(G, a∗) ≤ q ·Θ
(
q
( n
m2
)2)
= Θ
(
q2n2
m4
)
= Θ
(
n2
m2
)
.
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For the last case, suppose that q < m/2. We take one agent from each full resource in A, and move it to a (distinct)
empty resource to create B. Thus there is no resource that is full in both iterations. Hence the only agents that belong
to a full resource (and thus may have an opportunity to gain) in both iterations are the ones we moved. None of these
agents shares a resource with any other agent twice, and therefore no pair deviation is possible.
PROPOSITION 3. Let G be an SRSG with k steps, and a be a random NE in G. Denote r = q(k−1)m2 , then D2(G, a) ∼=(
n
2
)
(1− (1 + r)e−r).
Proof. Let (1, 2) be a random pair of agents. In each iteration, they share a resource w.p. of 1m . Also, if they do share
a resource, this resource is full w.p. of qm , thus they have a probability of α =
q
m2 to share a full resource. (1, 2) can
deviate iff they share at least two full resources. Equivalently, they do not have one iff they share exactly 0 or 1 full
resource, which occurs at probability of
β = (1 − α)k + k · α(1 − α)k−1
= (1 − α)k−1(1− α+ kα) ∼= e−α(k−1)(1 + α(k − 1))
= e−r(1 + r). (as r = q(k−1)m2 = α(k − 1))
Since every pair does not have a deviation w.p. β, the expected number of pair deviations is
(
n
2
)
(1 − β) =(
n
2
)
(1− (1 + r)e−r).
B Appendix: Proofs of Section 4
B.1 Characterizing pair deviations
Lemma 13. The following condition is both necessary and sufficient for the pair k < j−1 to have a deviation in UE:
j−1∑
t=k+1
(xt−1 − xt)(vk − vt−1) < a

vj−1 − s+1∑
r=j+1
wrvr−1

 ,
where according to our notations a = xj−1 − xj , and wr = xr−1−xrxj .
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 5. Let u(k), u′(k) be the utility of agent k before and after the
deviation. Recall that the best thing that the pair k < j − 1 can do, is that j reports b′j = bj+1, and k reports b′k = bj
(i.e. takes slot j − 1). The new utility of k in this case is u′(k) = (vk − bj+1)xj−1. For any x,v the utility of k
changes as follows:
u(k)−u′(k) = (vk − bUk+1)xk − (vk − bUj+1)xj−1
=(xk − xj−1)vk −
s+1∑
t=k+1
(xt−1 − xt)vt−1 + xj−1
xj
s+1∑
r=j+1
(xr−1 − xr)vr−1
=
j−1∑
l=k+1
(xl−1 − xl)vk −
j∑
t=k+1
(xt−1 − xt)vt−1 + (xj−1
xj
− 1)
s+1∑
r=j+1
(xr−1 − xr)vr−1
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=j−1∑
t=k+1
(xt−1 − xt)(vk − vt−1)− (xj−1 − xj)vj−1 + xj−1 − xj
xj
s+1∑
r=j+1
(xr−1 − xr)vr−1
=
j−1∑
t=k+2
(xt−1 − xt)(vk − vt−1)− a · vj−1 + a
s+1∑
r=j+1
wrvr−1
From Lemma 13 we can derive bounds on stability scores that are asymptotically equal to the ones we derived for
LE.
PROPOSITION 6. Given a UE, the pair of agents i, i+ 2 has a deviation for every i < s.
Proof. We take Lemma 13, and substitute j with k + 2. Then
u(k)− u′(k) =
k+1∑
t=k+1
(xt−1 − xt)(vk − vt−1)− a · vk+1 + a
s∑
r=k+2
wr+1vr
= (xk − xk+1)(vk − vk) + a
s∑
r=k+2
wr+1vr − a · vk+1 ≤ 0 + a (vk+2 − vk+1) < 0. (since a > 0)
Thus u′(k) > u(k) and agent k strictly gains by deviating with j = k + 2.
B.2 Counting pair deviations
THEOREM 7. Suppose that both CTR and valuation functions are convex. The number of pairs with deviations in the
Lower equilibrium can be upper bounded as follows.
(A) D2(GSP,LE) = O(s
√
s).
(B) if CTRs are β-convex then D2(GSP,LE) = O(s logβ s).
(C) if valuations are β-convex for any β ≥ 2, then only neighbor pairs can deviate. I.e., D2(GSP,LE) = s.
Theorem 7(a) is proved in the main text.
of 7(B). W.l.o.g. xs = 1. As in the previous proof, we denote a = xj−1 − xj ≥ βs−j(xs−1 − xs) = βs−j(β − 1).
We can now rewrite differences between CTRs as xi−1 − xi ≥ βj−ia for all i < j. Continuing from Lemma 5,
u(k)− u′(k) ≥
j−1∑
t=k+1
βj−ta(vk − vt)− a · vj + a
xj
s+1∑
r=j+1
(xr−1 − xr)vr
≥ a
(
j−1∑
t=k+1
βj−t(vk − vt)− vj + avg
s+1≥r≥j+1
vr
)
, (7)
where the inequality follows from the convexity of x. Thus we replace condition (4) from the linear CTR case with
j−1∑
t=k+1
βj−t(vk − vt) ≥ vj − avg
s+1≥r≥j+1
vr, (8)
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and make a similar analysis. Let h, z as in the linear case, then
j−1∑
t=k+1
βj−t(vk − vt) ≥
j−1∑
t=k+1
βj−tz
t− k
h
(as in (5))
=
h∑
t=1
βh+1−tz
t
h
=
z
h
βh+1
h∑
t=1
β−tt >
z
h
βh+1β−1 =
z
h
βh, (9)
Suppose now that h > logβ
s−j
2 , then from Eq. (6)
j−1∑
t=k+1
βj−t(vk − vt) ≥ z(s− j)
2h
≥ vj − avg
s+1≥r≥j+1
vr,
which means no agent gains from the deviation.
Thus each bidder can find at most O(logβ s) other bidders to collaborate with, or O(s logβ s) pairs in total.
For tightness, assume that valuations are linear. In this case, all inequalities except (9) become equalities. Now take
any pair such that j < s/2; 2h < logβ
s−j
2 . Then we have
h < logβ
s− j
2
− h < logβ
s− j
2
− logβ h = logβ
s− j
2h
⇒
j−1∑
t=k+1
βj−t(vk − vt) =
h∑
t=1
βh+1−tz
t
h
=
z
h
βh+1
h∑
t=1
β−tt
<
z
h
βh+1hβ−1 = zβh < z
s− j
2h
= vj − avg
s+1≥r≥j+1
vr,
and k strictly gains by manipulating with j. Moreover, there are at least s2
logβ
s
4
2 = Ω(s logβ s) such pairs, thus our
bound is tight.
of 7(C). Let any k, j such that j ≥ k + 2.
j−1∑
t=k+1
(vk − vt) ≥ vk − vk+1 ≥ 4(vj − vj+1) ≥ 2vj ≥ vj − avg
s≥t′≥j+1
vt′ .
Then by condition(4), the pair k, j cannot deviate.
THEOREM 8. Suppose that both CTR and valuation functions are concave. The number of pairs with deviations in the
Lower equilibrium can be lower bounded as follows.
(A) D2(GSP,LE) = Ω(s
√
s).
(B) if CTRs are β-concave for any β > 1, then D2(GSP,LE) = Ω(s2).
(C) if valuations are β-concave, for any β ≥ 2, then all pairs can deviate. I.e., D2(GSP,LE) =
(
s+1
2
)
= M2.
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Proof of 8(a). Consider the proof of Theorem 7(A). All the weak inequalities in the proof follow directly either from
the convexity of x, or from the convexity of r. If both functions are concave, all weak inequalities are reversed
(rounding expressions down rather than up). Therefore, a pair k, j = k + h+ 1 can deviate whenever
h+ 1 <
⌊
s− j
h
⌋
.
To see that there are Ω (s
√
s) such pairs, consider for example all pairs where j < s/2;h <
√
s/4.
Proof of 8(B). Consider Equation (8) in the proof of Theorem 7(B). As x is now concave, rather than convex, we have
xt−1 − xt ≤ βt−j(xj−1 − xj) for all t < j, and we should reverse the inequalities (7) and (8). We get the following
condition:
j−1∑
t=k+1
βt−j(vk − vt) < vj − avg
s+1≥r≥j+1
vr. (10)
Whenever condition (10) holds, deviation of k, j is guaranteed to succeed. Now, let h = j − k − 1 as in previous
sections. We show that each of the top (1− 1β )14s bidders can deviate with any bidder above her (note that this means
that there is a constant fraction of the total number of pairs that can deviate). We first upper bound the LHS:
j−1∑
t=k+1
βt−j(vk − vt) ≤ (vk − vj−1)
j−1∑
t=k+1
βt−j = (vk − vj−1)
j−k−1∑
t=1
βt
< (vk − vj−1)
∞∑
t=0
β−t ≤ (vk − vj−1) 1
1− 1β
≤ a · h 1
1− 1β
≤ a
(
(1− 1
β
)
1
4
s
)
1
1− 1β
=
1
4
· s · a
For the RHS, we have
vj − avg
s+1≥r≥j+1
vr ≥ vj − v j+s+1
2
≥ vj − vs/2 ≥ a
(s
2
− j
)
≥ a
(
s
2
− 1
4
βs
)
≥ 1
4
· s · a. (v is concave)
We therefore have that for all k < j < (1 − 1β )14s, condition (10) holds. Since β > 1 then (1 − 1β ) > 0, and
therefore there are Ω(s2) such pairs, where the constant depends on β. For example, for β = 2, there are at least(⌊ 18 s⌋
2
)
> 1100s
2 deviating pairs.
Proof of 8(C). By Equation (4), the pair j, k can deviate if
j−1∑
t=k+1
(vk − vt) < vj − avg
s+1≥r≥j+1
vr.
Since vi+1 − vi+2 > 2(vi − vi+1) for every i, for every t > k it holds that
vk − vt < vt − vt+1
2t−k
.
18
We get
j−1∑
t=k+1
(vk − vt) = (vk − vk+1)(j − k − 1) + (vk+1 − vk+2)(j − k − 2) + · · ·+ (vj−2 − vj−1)
<
vj−2 − vj−1
2j−k−2
(j − k − 1) + vj−2 − vj−1
2j−k−3
(j − k − 2) + · · ·+ vj−2 − vj−1
2
+ (vj−2 − vj−1)
=(vj−2 − vj−1)
j−k−2∑
t=0
t+ 1
2t
< (vj−2 − vj−1)
(
j−k−2∑
t=0
t
2t
+
j−k−2∑
t=0
1
2t
)
< (vj−2 − vj−1)(2 + 2)
<vj − vj+1 < vj − avg
s+1≥r≥j+1
vr.
This establishes the statement of the proposition.
B.3 Counting deviations of large coalitions
LEMMA 9. Suppose that R ⊆ N is a coalition that gains by a deviation, and let bj, b′j denote the bids of j ∈ R before
and after the deviation. Then the following hold:
1. There is at least one bidder i∗ ∈ R that does not gain anything from the deviation (an indifferent bidder).
Moreover, the slot allocated to i∗ is not affected.
2. There is at least one bidder f ∈ R that does not contribute anything to the deviation (a “free rider”). That is,
the utility of all bidders in R \ {f} does not decrease if f bids her equilibrium bid, and at least one j ∈ R \ {f}
still gains.
3. For all j ∈ R, either b′j < bj , or the utilities of all agents in R (including j) are unaffected by the bid of j.
Proof. We prove each property separately.
Indifferent bidder
First consider the bidder i∗ ∈ R that is ranked last after the deviation, and let i′ be the new slot allocated to i∗. Clearly
bi′+1 did not change, and thus if i∗ gains she would also gain by deviating unilaterally to b′i∗ = bi′+1 + ǫ. Therefore
i∗ is indifferent. Note that by our assumption that the game is generic, i′ = i∗, or otherwise bidder i∗ would strictly
lose.
Lowering bids
Suppose that k ∈ R strictly gains by bidding b′k and moving to some slot i. Let k∗ be the bidder such that bk∗ < b′k,
and maximal in that condition (i.e. the bidder located directly below the new slot of k). Then either: (i) k∗ ∈ R and
b′k∗ < bk∗ ; or (ii) there is some bidder t ∈ R such that t < k (i.e. bt > bk), but after the deviation b′t < b′k. Let t∗ be
the bidder t with the lowest b′t. If neither of (i),(ii) holds, then k is allocated the same slot or worse, and pays at least
as before.
Assume that b′k > bk. If case (ii) holds, then t∗ strictly loses, or otherwise she would weakly gain by bidding b′t∗
in a single deviation. Otherwise, note that k itself does not gain, and consider some j ∈ R. Either j < k, j remains
above k, or j > k and remains below k. In both cases j is unaffected, unless b′j < bk and maximal in that condition,
in which case j strictly loses by the move of k.
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Free rider
If R contains a pair of neighbors, this pair has a deviation regardless of the actions of all other bidders, and we can
clearly remove any bidder that is not a part of this pair. Assume therefore that R do not contain a pair of neighbors.
Consider the bidder f ∈ R that is ranked first among all bidders of R (after the deviation), and denote her new slot
by f ′. Clearly f does not contribute do any other bidder in R. R \ {f} still has a deviation (i.e. do exactly what they
did when f was part of the coalition), unless f is the only bidder that strictly gains by the deviation of R. Suppose we
are in the latter case. According to our generic games assumption, bidders that do not gain must keep their slots, and
by the previous paragraph, for all k ∈ R \ {f}, bk ≥ b′k ≥ bk+1. Consider t ∈ R, s.t. t 6= f ′ + 1 (there must be such
t, as |R| ≥ 3. If t = 1 bidder t is a free rider and we are done, thus assume t > 1.
Since R contains no neighbors, the bidder in slot t − 1 is not in R, and therefore the coalition R \ {t} still has a
deviation.
PROPOSITION 10. If both CTRs and valuations are convex, then
Dr(GSP,LE) ≤Mr ·O
(
r2√
s
)
.
In contrast, if both CTRs and valuations are concave, then
Dr(GSP,LE) ≥Mr · d ·
(
1− exp
(
−Ω
(
r
√
r√
s
)))
for any positive constant d < 1.
Proof of Proposition 10, upper bound. Recall that we only consider the top s+ r−1 bidders. The crucial observation
is that a coalition R can deviate iff it contains a pair that can deviate. This follows directly from Lemma 9, as we show
in Section 4.3.
For the upper bound, we take a coalition R that is sampled uniformly from all Mr possible coalitions, and bound
the probability that it contains a deviating pair. Recall that from the proof of Theorem 7(a), a pair k, j can deviate only
if they are at most
√
s− j ≤ √s slots apart.
A coalition of size r contains
(
r
2
)
= O(r2) pairs, and each such pair has a probability of at most 2
√
s
s =
O
(
1√
s+r
)
= O
(
1√
s
)
. From the union bound we get that the probability that a random coalition R contains any
deviating pair is at most O
(
r2√
s
)
.
Proof of Proposition 10, lower bound. If r ≥ s/2, then R contains a pair of neighbors and therefore surely has a
deviation. Similarly, if r = ω(
√
s), then R contains a neighbor pair with high probability. Assume therefore that
r is relatively small w.r.t. s, say r < s2/3. Note that for all t ≤ r, (st) = ( st−1) s−tt ≥ ( st−1)s1/3. By induction,(
s
r
) ≥ (st)s1/3·(r−t).
Let c < 1 be a constant, d =
√
c.
Lemma 14. For a sufficiently large s, (sr) > d ·Mr.
Proof. Consider the sum Mr−1 =
∑
t=1 r − 1
(
s
t
)
. It holds that
Mr−1 ≤
r−1∑
t=1
(
s
r
)
s1/3(t−r) =
(
s
r
) r−1∑
t=1
(s1/3)−t ≤ 2s−1/3
(
s
r
)
.
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In particular, for a sufficiently large s, we have that 2s−1/3 < 1 − d, and thus Mr−1 < (1 − d)Mr. Recall that
Mr = Mr−1 +
(
s
r
)
, thus (
s
r
)
= Mr −Mr−1 > Mr − (1 − d)Mr = d ·Mr.
As we perform an asymptotic analysis, we indeed assume that s is as large as required.
Let q = d2/r. We consider coalitions of size r in slots 1, 2, . . . , qs (i.e. coalitions of the first type only). We show
that there is only a small fraction of the
(
qs
r
)
coalitions do not have a deviation.
Lemma 15.
(
qs
r
) ≥ d · (sr).
Proof.
q = d2/r = e2 ln(d)/r >
(
1 +
2 ln d
r
)
(11)
(
qs
r
)(
s
r
) = (qs)!(s− r)!
s!(qs− r)! =
r∏
t=1
qs− t
s− t ≥
(
qs− r
s− r
)r
>
(
s+ 2 ln dr s− r
s− r
)r
(from (11))
=
(
1 +
2s lnd
r(s− r)
)r
>
(
1 +
ln d
r − 1
)r
≥ exp
(
ln(d)r
r
)
= exp(ln d) = d.
Also, from Equation (11),
√
1− q ≥
√
1−
(
1 +
2 lnd
r
)
=
√
−2 ln(d)
r
> d′
1√
r
, (12)
where d′ > 0 is some constant independent of r and s.
We construct our coalition iteratively, lower bounding in every iteration the probability that a deviating pair is
formed. Since all bidders are in slots ≤ qs, it is sufficient for the first pair k, j to deviate if they are at most √s− j ≥√
s− qs =
√
s(1− q) slots apart. If the first pair are too far away, the third selected bidder has a double chance to
have a deviation (with at least one of them). If this fails, the fourth bidder can be in the proximity of either of the first
three, and so on.
Denote by Et the event that the bidder selected in iteration t has a deviation with one of the previous bidders.
Suppose that none of the t − 1 previous bidders has a deviation. The new bidder t has qs − (t − 1) available slots.
There are at least (t − 1)
√
s(1− q) slot that are in the proximity of previous bidders, since there is a “dangerous”
interval of size (at least)
√
s(1− q) around each bidder, and these intervals are distinct (otherwise there is a deviating
pair). Formally, this can be written as
Pr(Et|∀t′ < t,¬Et′) ≥ (t− 1)
√
s(1− q)
qs− t+ 1 . (13)
We have that for a random coalition R drawn from 1, 2, . . . , qs, the probability that R does not contain a deviating
pair, is
Pr(¬Et for all t = 2, 3, . . . , r) = Pr(¬E2)Pr(¬E3|¬E2) · · ·Pr(¬Er |∀t′ < r,¬Et′ )
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≤
(
1− 2
√
s(1 − q)
qs− 1
)
· · ·
(
1− (r − 1)
√
s(1− q)
qs− r + 1
)
(from (13))
<
r−1∏
t=1
(
1− t
√
s(1− q)
s
)
≤
r−1∏
t=⌊r/2⌋
(
1− t
√
s(1− q)
s
)
≤
r−1∏
t=⌊r/2⌋
(
1−
⌊r
2
⌋ √s(1 − q)
s
)
≤
(
1−
⌊ r
2
⌋ √(1− q)
s
)⌈ r2⌉−1
≤
(
1− (r − 1)
√
1− q
2
√
s
) r−2
2
≤
(
1− d′ r − 1
2
√
s
√
r
) r−2
2
(from (12))
≤ exp
(
−d′ (r − 1)(r − 2)
4
√
s
√
r
)
= exp
(
−Ω
(
r
√
r√
s
))
Thus there are at least
(
qs
r
) (
1− exp
(
−Ω
(
r
√
r√
s
)))
coalitions of size r with deviations. Finally, we get from Lem-
mas 15 and 14 that
(
qs
r
) ≥ d(sr) ≥ d2Mr = cMr, thus
Dr(GSP,LE) ≥ c ·Mr ·
(
1− exp
(
−Ω
(
r
√
r√
s
)))
as required.
C Appendix: Proofs of Section 5
VCG with reserve price c is typically defined as follows: remove bidders whose value is below c. Now run VCG on
remaining bidders.
In our definition, we said that each remaining bidder pays the maximum between her original VCG payment and c.
Proposition 16. The two definitions are equivalent.
Proof. Let pi denote the original payment of agent i in VCG without a reserve price. p′i is the payment with reserve
price according to the first definition, and p′′i is the payment according to the second definition. That is, p′′i =
max(c, pi) if vi ≥ c and 0 otherwise.
Let αi = xixi−1 . According to Varian(?), pi = bi+1, where bi is recursively defined as follows. bs+1 = vs+1, and
pi−1 = bi = αivi + (1− αi)bi+1.
Let j be the index of the lowest surviving bidder. Clearly if j ≥ s+ 1 then both auctions coincide with the original
VCG auction, as the reserve price is not used at all. Therefore suppose j ≤ s.
We now turn to compute p′i in the same way. Suppose we add a positive term δ to all valuations. Then clearly all
payments will also increase by δ.
Since all values (after removing the low bidders) are above c, we can decrease all vi by c, to v′i = vi − c, and
add c to the final payment. That is, p′ = p∗ + c, where p∗ are the VCG payments for valuations v′. We claim that
p∗i = pi− c. The base case of the induction is p∗j = b∗j+1 = 0 (since there are at most s bidders). The next bidder pays
p∗j−1 = b
∗
j = αjv
′
j = αj(vj − c).
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